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DUE PROCESS AND POLLUTION:
THE RIGHT TO A REMEDY
FERDINAND

F. FERNANDEZt

"The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in
the right of every individual to claim the protection of
the laws, whenever he receives an injury."'
I.

INTRODUCTION

N OW THAT THE LUSTROUS FINISH of our affluent society
is starting to tarnish we find that part of the problem is caused
by the wastes with which we are polluting the environment. The
most obvious assaults have been made upon air 2 and water. There
are others." The earth is reeling from attacks by pesticide pollution,5
heat pollution," noise pollution,7 and general chemical pollution (from
the use of, for example, virulent defoliants8 and detergents9 ).
This degradation of the environment raises more than questions
of aesthetics or longings for primeval days. At its root it is the very
question of survival. Pollution is destroying our property. It may
also be destroying us. We have been told that pollution of the air
t Member of the California Bar. B.S., University of Southern California, 1958;
LL.B., University of Southern California, 1962; LL.M., Harvard University, 1966.
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
2. See, e.g., Gage, Danger in the Air, The Wall Street Journal, May 26, 1970,
at 1, col. 1; R. Rienow & L. Rienow, The Age of Eternal Twilight, 72 AUDUBON,
July 1970, at 4.
3. See, e.g., Bylinsky, The Limited War on Water Pollution, 81 FORTUNE,
February 1970, at 102; Oglesby, Conversation with a Worried Man, 67 POMONA
TODAY, February 1970, at 2; Stead, Losing the Water Battle, 3 CRY CALIFORNIA,
Summer 1968, at 15.
4. E.g., Murdoch & Connell, All About Ecology, INTERACTION, April 1970, at 9.
Cf. 223 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, September 1970, at 1 (Biosphere Issue).
5. See, e.g., R. RUDD, PESTICIDES AND THE LIVING LANDSCAPE (1964) ; Lay-

cock, Where Have All the Pelicans Gone?, 71 AUDUBON, September 1969, at 10;

Peakall, Pesticides and the Reproduction of Birds, 222 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, April

1970, at 73.
6. See, e.g., Graham, Tempest in a Nuclear Teapot, 72 AUDUBON, March 1970,
at 13.
7. See, e.g., AMBASSADOR

COLLEGE RESEARCH

DEPARTMENT,

OUR

(1968).
8. See, e.g.,

POLLUTED

PLANET 50

THE

STANFORD BIOLOGY STUDY GROUP, A LEGACY OF OUR PRESENCE,
DESTRUCTION OF INDOCHINA (California Tomorrow Pamphlet 1970).

9. See, e.g., Pollution Percentages in Detergents Listed, Progress-Bulletin
(Pomona), September 6, 1970, at 1, col. 1.

(789)
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is contributing to the increase of lung diseases, such as lung cancer,
emphysema, bronchitis, and asthma.'0 The cost of air pollution was
estimated to run as high as eleven billion dollars per year in 1967.11
Surely it has increased! The cost of crop losses on the eastern seaboard alone, in 1967, was estimated at eighteen million dollars per
year. 12 News services recently reported that some citrus trees in California are now being placed in oxygen tents so that they can survive.'
It has been estimated in testimony before Congress that an average
family of four could easily be spending eight hundred dollars per
year because of air pollution, while even a poor family could be spend14
ing at least two hundred and fifty dollars per year.
Water resources are being ravaged and destroyed. They are
being attacked by infectious agents, fertilizers, chemical and mineral
wastes, insecticides, petroleum pollutants, lead poisons, radioactive
material, and trash.' The result is that rivers have turned into open
sewers and lakes into cesspools. A recent analysis of water from the
Ohio River near Cincinnati revealed content of, among other things,
coliform organisms from sewage, viruses (including hepatitis and
polio), inorganic chemicals, cyanide, D.D.T., heptachlor, and radio-

active substances.'" The Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, Ohio, recently
burst into flames. 17 Even the oceans, from which many envision
bountiful harvests to feed the starving masses of the world, are being
polluted. The estuaries, which are the most important areas of the
sea for food production, are also the most polluted areas." Heat
pollution poses a further threat to our waters and their productivity."0
Pesticides, particularly the hard pesticides, present additional
dangers. It is well known that they are destroying some of our finest
birds through their effect on eggshell production.2" For example, in
10. See, e.g., Report of Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Hearings
on S. 3112 Before Subcomr. on Air and Water Pollution of Senate Comm. on Public
Works, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1966). See also Hearings on Air Quality Criteria
Before Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of Senate Comm. on Public Works,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1968).
11. Hearings on S. 780 Before Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of Senate
Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1582-83 (1967).
12. Id. at 1585.
13. Oxygen Tents Save Oranges from Smog, Progress-Bulletin (Pomona), July

16, 1970, at 1, col. 3.
14. See note 11 supra.
15. Reitze, Wastes, Water, and Wishful Thinking: The Battle of Lake Erie, 20
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 5, 6-7 (1968).
16. See Bylinsky, supra note 3, at 103.
17. Id.
18. E.g., Oglesby, supra note 3, at 2. Cf. Swanton, The Mad Harbor Party, 3
CRY CALIFORNIA, Summer 1968, at 22. In any event it is not probable that the prediction of such bountiful harvests will be fulfilled. Woodwell, The Energy Cycle of

the Biosphere, 223

SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN,

September 1970, at 64, 70-71.

19. See Graham, supra note 6.
20. Peakall, supra note 5, at 73.
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California there were almost no successful hatchings of brown pelican
chicks during the last nesting season. 2 ' In addition, such pesticides may
destroy the oceanic organisms which produce most of our oxygen,22
a matter over which we should show some concern. More immediately, studies have suggested that these pesticides are causing brain
and liver diseases in human beings.2"
The above comments are rather cryptic, since this is not intended
to be a scientific disquisition. Nor is it intended to convince the reader
that property and lives are being detroyed by reason of pollution.
The referenced works, and countless others, carry that burden. It is
herein assumed that injuries are caused by pollution and that the
various toxicants to which we are subjected may well bring about
later illnesses, though their effects upon any particular person may
not be obvious at this time. The question is: What can be done about
it? This article will suggest one possible answer to that question.
Many solutions have been proposed to the average man. They
range from "stop having children," 24 to "take shorter showers."2 5
Legislation is also an obvious possibility, and some laws have been
passed. 6 Unfortunately, it is often ingenuous to place one's hope in
the legislative process, since legislators are subjected to lobbying pressures and often find it necessary to compromise and avoid enacting
real solutions.2 ' Executive enforcement, likewise, has often been rather
lax. The people may therefore find it unwise to sit and wait for
solutions from these sources, and may instead turn to the courts for
help. When the courts are turned to the common and statutory law
they should be able to find a remedy for the aggrieved citizen. Certainly the common law is viable and resilient enough to fashion
effective remedies from its historic materials. But here again, as will
21. Laycock, supra note 5, at 16.

22. See note 18 supra; Wurster, DDT Reduces Photosynthesis by Marine Phyto-

plankton, 159

SCIENCE

1474 (1968).

23. Radomski, Deichmann & Clizer, Pesticide Concentrations in the Liver, Brain
and Adipose Tissue of Terminal Hospital Patients, 6 FooD & Cosm. ToxIcoLOGY 209
(1968). See also Peakall, supra note 5, at 78.
24. E.g., Ehrlich, People Pollution, 72 AUDUBON, May 1970, at 4.
25.

CAILLIET

&

SETZER,

EVERYMAN'S

GUIDE

TO

CONSERVATIONAL

LIVING

11

(1970). While the shower suggestion may sound somewhat whimsical this booklet is
an extremely valuable reference, and all of its suggestions, taken together, would
eliminate a good deal of pollution and waste at the personal level. The booklet is
available from Santa Barbara Underseas Foundation, P.O. Box 4815, Santa Barbara,
California 93103.
26. See Congressional Scoreboard, 55 SIERRA CLUB BULL., July 1970. See also
Robie & Hume, Practice Under California's New Porter-Cologne Water Quality
Control Act, 45 L.A. BAR BULL. 177 (1970); Tyler, Methods for State Level
Enforcement of Air and Water Pollution Laws, 31 TEXAS BAR J. 905 (1968). For
a call for international legislation, see Sweeney, Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 37
FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 182-86 (1968).
27. See Delogu, Effluent Charges: A Method of Enforcing Stream Standards,

19 MAINE L. REV. 29 (1967) ; Hill, The Politics of Air Pollution: Public Interest
and Pressure Groups, 10 ARIZ. L. REV. 37 (1968). Cf. Simmons, Politics in Water
Planning, 5 CRY CALIFORNIA, Winter 1969, at 14.
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be noted below, most scholars have not predicted great success. Many
of the rules and approaches of law developed during the relatively
recent industrial past seem to present almost insurmountable obstacles.
If neither the common law nor the legislature seems capable of
solving these serious problems. either because of political pressures,
balancing of interests, or just plain rigidity, we would do well to look
to the United States Constitution and to the constitutions of the
various states. Constitutions with their immutable principles and promises of the good life are the final source of comfort and aid. This article
will show that those who look to the constitutions will not look in vain.
The "due process" clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the
Constitution of the United States, as well as similar clauses in state constitutions, supply the needed relief if it cannot be found elsewhere.
II.

THE EXISTING COMMON LAW

The great resources of the common law should provide remedies
to solve our pollution problems. One thinks of the law of negligence,
strict liability, trespass, nuisance, riparian rights, and admiralty.
Negligence law appears to present an appropriate sort of remedy.
It seems particularly inviting since it has long been established that
a manufacturer may be liable to secondary purchasers, 2 and, even to
those who are not within the chain of title. 29 If a wheel which flies

off of an automobile and injures a bystander can be a source of liability
for negligence, should not poison gases be treated in the same fashion?
A manufacturer should likewise be held liable for direct physical injuries or property damage caused by negligent use of his facilities."
Another useful negligence concept is the theory- that a manufacturer
who places dangerous articles on the market will be liable to persons
injured therefrom, notwithstanding a lack of present means to make
the articles safe or the general custom in the industry."' The negligence remedy has been suggested before.32 However, it has been pointed
out that it is often an illusory remedy because of the kind of balancing
test used in defining duty, and because of the causation problems presented when an illness develops over a long period of time. 3 There is
28. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050

(1916).
29. McLeod v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 318 Mo. 397, 1 S.W.2d 122 (1927).
30. See, e.g., Food Mach. & Chem. Corp. v. Meader, 294 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.
1961); Hagy v. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 122 Cal. App. 2d 361, 265 P.2d 86 (1953).

31. Grant v. Graham Chero-Cola Bottling Co., 176 N.C. 256, 97 S.E. 27 (1918).
Cf. Claude v. Weaver Constr. Co., 261 Iowa 1225, 158 N.W.2d 139 (1968), where
punitive damages were allowed in an air pollution case, despite claims of good faith
and use of modern equipment.
32. See Juergensmeyer,

Control of Air Pollution Through the Assertion of

Private Rights, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1126, 1142; Sweeney, supra note 26, at 171.
33. Juergensmeyer, supra note 32.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol16/iss5/1

4

Fernandez: Due Process and Pollution: The Right to a Remedy

MAY

1971 ]

DUE PROCESS AND POLLUTION

also a problem with damages. If a citizen must wait for lung cancer to
strike before he sues, the remedy, obviously, will come too late.
Strict liability in tort would also seem to be a useful concept in
states that have adopted it in general form. The concept imposes
liability upon a manufacturer in the absence of proof of negligence.84
This applies to personal injuries,"' property damage,"6 and even protects non-purchasing third parties.8 7 Again, being saturated with poison
gases from exhaust emissions should create liability just as being struck
by a defective part of an automobile creates it. However, this concept
suffers from some of the same problems as the negligence remedy.88
Where the pollution has become so great as to cause particulate
matter to settle upon and injure property, a trespass action against
the polluter would seem appropriate. The mere fact that the particles
are invisible to the naked eye should be irrelevant; the intrusion of
particles upon the property of the plaintiff should be sufficient.8 9 Radiation can be treated in the same manner. Injunctive relief ought to
be available to prevent this type of injury, but if a balancing test is
used, the hoped-for remedy may be rendered entirely ineffective.4
The remedy provided by the law of nuisance could be particularly
effective in dealing with pollution. 4 ' Air pollution, for example, has
been treated as a nuisance for centuries, 4 for nothing in the world
should require people to abide filthy air. Furthermore, distinctions
between public and private nuisance, the former not creating liability
to private parties, should not present a significant stumbling block
in this area. The mere fact that the wrongdoer is injuring many
people should not deprive any single individual of an effective remedy
against him. 48 The public nuisance doctrine should be founded on
invasion of a common right rather than a wholesale invasion of private
34. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr.

896 (1964).

35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17 (1965) ; Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966).
37. See, e.g., Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84,
75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969).
38. See Juergensmeyer, supra note 32, at 1148; Rheingold, Civil Cause of Action
for Lung Damage Due to Pollution of Urban Atmosphere, 33 BROOKLYN L. REV. 17

(1966).

39. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Ore. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960).
40. See Juergensmeyer, supra note 32, at 1138; Maloney, Plager & Baldwin,
Water Pollution - Attempts to Decontaminate Florida Law, 20 U. FLA. L. Rnv. 131
(1967). See also Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331,

83 S.W. 658 (1904).

41. For a detailed discussion of the law of nuisance and pollution, see Comment,
The Use of Private Actions to Control Environmental Pollution in Pennsylvania,
16 VILL. L. REv. 920 (1971).

42. See William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611).
43. Fisher v. Zumwalt, 128 Cal. 493, 61 P. 82 (1900).
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rights.4 4 The latter is simply a private nuisance injuring many persons.
Each man surely has a private and personal right to clean, or at least
non-toxic, air.45 As one court said long ago: "If a man commits an
assault on every person in a town or poisons the town's reservoir, he
will not be permitted to defend an individual's action against him by
claiming that he did the same thing to everyone else." 46 Pollution
poisons our reservoir of air and the same theory should apply. Even
the presence of many different polluting sources should not present an
obstacle to suit.4" Nevertheless, many authors believe that because of
the apparent public-private nuisance dichotomy, the sometimes required need for special injury, prescriptive rights, and balancing tests,
private nuisance law will not be useful in combating pollution.48
Assertions of riparian rights 49 and bringing of libels in admiralty"
are rather special situations which will not be discussed in detail.
Suffice it to say that they appear to have the same defects as the other
remedies described above. 5 '
The many aforementioned defects have caused commentators to
complain that the common law, designed in a simpler age, cannot cope
with our present problems.52 This has generated calls for more special
legislation and for new remedies. Legislation has been enacted53 and
new tools are being fashioned.5 4 This is all to the good. However,
we should not lose sight of the fact that the old law and the ancient
concepts can do an admirable job of solving many of the present
problems. Some courts, for example, rejected balancing tests long
ago on the well-reasoned ground that balancing simply puts the little
44. Id.

45. 1 J. LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED
§ 236 (3d ed. 1909). See also Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S.
230 (1907).
46. Story v. Hammond, 4 Ohio 376, 378 (1831).
47. See United Verde Extension Mining Co. v. Ralston, 37 Ariz. 554, 296 P. 262
STATES

(1931); California Orange Co. v. Riverside Portland Cement Co., 50 Cal. App. 522,

195 P. 694 (1920).

48. See, e.g., Juergensmeyer, supra note 32, at 1134-37; Porter, The Role of
Private Nuisance Law in the Control of Air Pollution, 10 ARIZ. L. REV. 107, 113-14
(1968); Reitze, supra note 15, at 62.
522, 83 N.E. 1048
49. See Tetherington v. Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co., 232 Ill.
(1908); Comment, Water Pollution Control in New York, 31 ALBANY L. REV. 50
(1967); Note, Stream Pollution - Recovery of Damages, 50 IowA L. REV. 141
(1964).
50. See Salaky v. Atlas Tank Processing Corp., 120 F. Supp. 225 (E.D.N.Y.),
rev'd on facts, 208 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1953) ; Sweeney, supra note 26.
51. See notes 49 & 50 supra.
52. See, e.g., Reitze, supra note 15, at 65.
53. See note 26 supra; United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966);
Comment, Federal Pollution Control: Participationby States and Individuals Enhances
the National Pollution Control Effort, 16 VILL. L. REV. 827 (1971).
54. For recent conservation victories, see Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir.
1970) ; Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) ; Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley
v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 97 (1970). See also
16 VILL. L. REV. 729, 766 (1971). For a recent loss, see Boomer v. Atlantic Cement
Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
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person at the mercy of the more powerful.," Many of the solutions
have already been found; a resort to them would be most helpful.5
In the meantime, if there is a tendency to refuse to reach for the
tools at hand or to rapidly fashion new ones, we can look to the constitutions to help speed the process.
III.

MISCELLANEOUS FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS

In addition to due process - the major source of constitutional
rights - there are at least two other sources which can be relied upon.
They are not discussed here in depth because, to a large extent, remedies based upon them must be fashioned out of whole cloth, and
lengthy historical analysis would merely be a form of self-justification.
One is tempted to look to the Preamble to the United States
Constitution, with its generally stated purpose to secure the welfare
of the people and the blessings of liberty." It might well be argued
that welfare and liberty are not provided unless the citizen is given
the power to eliminate pollution's threat to his very existence. Certainly each man must have the right to do away with things that will
destroy his health and property. A rather extensive argument might
be built around this central concept, but while the Supreme Court
has often referred to the Preamble as showing that all power comes
from the people,5" it has also indicated that the Preamble itself is not
a source of rights and powers which are not found elsewhere in
the Constitution. 9
Another source of protection might be the ninth amendment,
which states that the enumeration "of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.""' Just
as this amendment contains the germ of the right of privacy,6 ' it might
well be argued that it contains the right of the citizen to protect his
health from pollution-induced disease, to live in basic dignity with62
out filth, and to preserve his property from slow destruction.
55. See Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239, 118 P. 928

(1911).

56. See, e.g., Steinberg, Rights Under California Law of the Individual Injured
by Air Pollution, 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 405 (1954).
57. Similar statements can be found in state constitutions, see, e.g., CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 1; PA. CONST. art. I, § 25.
58. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) ; Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) ; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419

(1793).
59. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905). See 1 STORY, COMMENTTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 462 (2d ed. 1851).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.

61. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) ; People v. Belous, 71 Cal.
2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
tion

62. Rathwell, Air Pollution, Pre-Emption, Local Problems and the ConstituSome Pigeonholes and Hatracks, 10 ARIZ. L. REV. 97, 105 (1968). See also
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The above approaches, and particularly the appeal to the ninth
amendment, may well be sufficient to spell out a constitutional right
to be free from pollution, and it is not the purpose of this article to
denigrate them. Indeed, some of the cases outlined below might help
those who wish to spell out rights under the ninth amendment.
IV.

DUE PROCESS

The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment declares that
no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. ..

."

The fifth amendment, of course, contains a

similar provision regarding the federal government, and state constitutions bind their governments to the same principle.
It is the thesis of this article that due process requires each state
(and the federal government when it has jurisdiction) to provide the
people with remedies for injuries caused to their persons or property
by pollution, and that when the polluting agent threatens to cause
damage over a long period by reason of its chronic presence, injunctive or some similar form of relief must be provided. This is a declaration that effective redress for the wrongs caused by pollution is not
merely a desideratum, but a right.
Some might object and argue that while due process can be traced
to chapter 39 of the Magna Charta of 1215, the right to a remedy stems
from a separate section -

chapter 40 -

of that document. 3

Indeed,

while forty-nine of the states include a due process provision in their
constitutions, only thirty-two states also declare the right of every
man to a remedy by due course of law for his injuries.64 But such an
historical approach would be entirely too formalistic. In the first
place, both of these chapters were unified into chapter 29 when the
Magna Charta was reissued in 1229, and have remained together
since.65 More importantly, the right to an appropriate remedy has
always been considered such an integral part of our concepts of ordered
liberty that courts have treated this right as part and parcel of due
process. 6 While it may sometimes be rather loosely believed that a
state can take away remedies for wrongs not yet committed, or otherwise use the principle of damnum absque injuria to deny relief where
a substantial wrong has been perpetrated, that simply is not the case.
Exposito, Air and Water Pollution: What To Do While Waiting for Washington,
5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 32 (1970).
63. A. HOWARD, THE ROAD FROm RUNNYMEDE (1968).

64. Id. at 479-87. Note that remedy and due process clauses entirely overlap in
four states since "remedy by due course of law" is their due process clause. Id. at 481.
65. Id. at 284.
66. Sanner v. Trustees of Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hosp 278 F. Supp. 138, 141
(D. Md.), aff'd, 398 F.2d 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982 (1968) ; Herkey
v. Agar Mfg. Co., 90 Misc. 457, 460-64, 153 N.Y.S. 369, 371-73 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
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The Supreme Court has declared that all state legislation must adhere
to fundamental principles of right and justice, and that an attempt to
strip a person of his remedy is the equivalent of sanctioning an invasion of his rights." Nor was that an isolated statement made in
the heat of judicial rhetoric. Courts have often recognized that the
removal of the safeguards protecting us from wrongful injuries may
well result in the destruction of life and liberty, and may subject a
citizen to unlawful imprisonment, dismemberment, or even death.6"
For example, when the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
was asked to express an opinion on a proposed statute which would
prevent the courts from entertaining actions against any trade union
or officer or member thereof for any tortious act, it answered that
such a law would deprive individuals of the safety, liberty, and property which must be secured to all subjects of a free government."' For
this reason, and others, the court declared that such a statute would
violate the constitutions of the United States and Massachusetts.7
In a similar vein, a federal district court has refused to hold that an
alien, who is in the country illegally, is stripped of his right to bring
a negligence action.7 1 While the decision rested upon equal protection,
the court referred to the defendant's position as one permitting the
alien to be despoiled of his property and assaulted without redress, a
position the court, in common justice, could not accept.72 Permitting
injury without a right of recovery is simply abhorrent to our whole
concept of ordered justice and will not be tolerated.73
It might be argued that where no remedy is supplied, or where
a wrong is only "permitted," there is no state action and no violation
of fourteenth amendment requirements. However, it has been held
that by repealing certain laws, the state might well be a partner in the
discriminatory actions of private individuals, and thereby be in violation of the Constitution.74 The act of withholding remedies consti67. Traux v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 329-30 (1921). Cf. United States v.
Petersen, 91 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Cal. 1950), aff'd, 191 F.2d 154 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 885 (1951); Gregory v. Colvin, 235 Ark. 1007, 363 S.W.2d 539

(1963).

68. Cf. Vanderbilt v. Hegeman, 157 Misc. 908, 911, 284 N.Y.S. 586, 590 (Sup.
Ct. 1935) ; Herkey v. Agar Mfg. Co., 90 Misc. 457, 461, 153 N.Y.S. 369, 371 (Sup.
Ct. 1915).
69. In re Opinion of the Justices, 211 Mass. 618, 98 N.E. 337 (1912).
70. Id. at 619-20, 98 N.E. at 337-38.
71. Martinez v. Fox Valley Bus Lines, 17 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1936).
72. Id. at 577.
73. Miller v. Howe Sound Mining Co., 77 F. Supp. 540 (E.D. Wash. 1948);
People ex rel. McDonough v. Cesar, 349 Ill. 372, 182 N.E. 448 (1932), cert. denied,
288 U.S. 603 (1933) ; Paul v. Nolen, 166 So. 509 (La. App. 1936) ; Clark v. McClain
Fire Brick Co., 100 Ohio St. 110, 125 N.E. 877 (1919).

74. Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966),
aff'd, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). Indeed, merely applying the state's long standing common
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tutes state action, whether they are withdrawn by a legislative body75
or by the courts.76 Perhaps more importantly, we are not concerned
here with a claim that the state is failing to eliminate some merely
private impropriety, which, if committed by the government, would
be a violation of due process or equal protection concepts. That is,
we are not trying to apply an interdiction against state wrong to
private persons by using the bootstrap "inaction is action" argument.
In this discussion we are at the very core of due process itself. It is
the thesis of this article that the state is under a clear affirmative obligation to supply a remedy for wrongs to the individual caused by
pollution, and failure to supply that remedy is an ipso facto denial of
due process to those who make complaints in the state courts. If the
aggrieved individual is sent away from the courts with the message
that he must suffer the loss of life, liberty, or property with no chance
of recovery, he has been deprived of these through the action of the
state. In practical effect the state will have affirmatively declared that
his life, liberty, or property can be taken without redress. To return
to the earlier equivalency, due process means, among other things,
that every individual is entitled to a remedy for injuries done to his
person or property. The failure to grant that remedy constitutes the
violation, without further disputation.
In the discussion which follows, cases dealing with property and
those dealing with life and liberty are considered separately. All
divisions into categories of this type tend to be somewhat arbitrary.7 7
This is particularly true in the due process area, for the courts have
made it clear that the rights in question are co-extensive and equally
important.7" It has been said that destruction of one may well extinguish the others, 79 and that there is no reason in logic or policy to
give any one of these rights less protection than another."0 Thus, the
principles developed in the two separate parts should not be considered
separate weapons. They are congruent.
law principles may involve the state in various violations of constitutional rights.
Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016
(1969), and cases cited therein.
75. Cf. Clifton Hills Realty Co. v. Cincinnati, 60 Ohio App. 443, 454, 21 N.E.2d
993, 999 (1938).
76. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Say. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930) ; Gregory
v. Colvin, 235 Ark. 1007, 363 S.W.2d 539 (1963).
77. For example, libel and negligence actions, as well as privacy, might be considered within one's property rights. However, since they are so often concerned

with a person's physical or moral integrity they are treated here as aspects of life

and liberty.
78. See, e.g., Clark v. Mitchell, 64 Mo. 564, 577 (1877), rev'd on other grounds,
110 U.S. 633 (1884).
79. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley, 59 Cal. 2d 247, 256, 379 P.2d 22,
28, 28 Cal. Rptr. 718, 724 (1963).

80. Joe Louis Milk Co. v. Hershey, 243 F. Supp. 351, 354 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
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A.

Due Process and Property

Due process obviously precludes a governmental entity from
directly seizing a citizen's property for its own use without compensation. However, it does much more than that - the operative verb
is not "take" it is "deprive," which is much broader. The Supreme
Court has held that Congress may not simply legislate a contract out
of existence, for valid contracts are property rights.8 ' Nor may the
executive unilaterally cancel a patent, even on grounds of fraud, for
that would violate due process of law." If the government, by any
means, gave one man's rightful property to another, a gross violation
of due process would occur.83 It would not matter if this were accomplished by taxing the former in order to support the latter's private
enterprise.8 4 Such "robbery" will not be permitted.85 A law which
turns an existing property right into a cause of action and then imposes a statute of limitations thereby forfeiting that property right is
equally obnoxious. As one court said, the legislature cannot Don
Quixote-like set up an imaginary windmill and then order the property owner to demolish it by legal procedures on pain of losing his
property. 6 Similarly, the courts have prevented religious organizations and lodges from depriving members 7 or member lodges 8 of
their property without approval of the affected parties. To permit
such deprivation would unconstitutionally convert one man's property
to another's use, without the former's consent. Retroactive liability
89
has the same effect and is also execrable.
While all of the above abuses involve some aspect of taking, the
Constitution is equally violated if an individual is merely deprived of
the use or benefit of his property without a fair hearing. An ordinance which would have driven the Chinese in the City of San Francisco from their homes was treated as an arbitrary confiscation of
property." The same result was reached when a city tried to destroy
81. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934).
82. Nobel v. Union River Logging R.R. Co., 147 U.S. 165, 176 (1893).
83. Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U.S. 139, 161 (1913). Cf. the following
early state cases, where the due process provisions of Magna Charta were directly
relied upon: Hooper v. Burges, 57 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 571 (C. Hall ed. 1940)
and 34 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 676 (C. Hall ed. 1914) (Provincial Ct. 1670) ; and
Bowman v. Middleton, 1 S.C. 101 (1792).
84. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Topeka City, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 664 (1875).
85. Id. at 664.
86. Leavenworth v. Claughton, 197 Miss. 606, 20 So. 2d 821 (1945). See also
Murrison v. Fenstermacher, 166 Kan. 568, 203 P.2d 160 (1949).
87. St. John the Baptist Greek Catholic Church v. Gengor, 121 N.J. Eq. 349,
189 A. 113 (Ct. Err. & App. 1937).
88. Supreme Lodge, L.O.M. v. Los Angeles Lodge, No. 386, L.O.M., 177 Cal.
132, 169 P. 1040 (1917).
89. William Danzer & Co. v. Gulf & Ship Island R.R. Co., 268 U.S. 633 (1925);
State, to Use of Maines v. A/S Nye Kristianborg, 84 F. Supp. 775, 780 (D. Md.
1949).
90. In re Lee Sing, 43 F. 359 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1890).
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the value of property through a zoning ordinance which unreasonably
restricted the property's use and transferability. 91 And while preventing a man from using his property may be permitted in special circumstances,9 2 all of the historical and commercial justifications for
attachments were insufficient to support them against the claim that
they deprived a wage earner of property without due process of law.9"
The deprivation was the use of his property during pendency of
the suit."4
If taking, shifting ownership of, and preventing owners' use of
property are all prohibited, it should follow that removing the remedies which protect the owners' property interests is also prohibited.
After all, the result would be the same. This prohibition does indeed
exist. It requires an available and effective remedy for the present
and prospective harm caused by pollution. There is nothing radical
about this assertion, as will now appear.
In 1852, some citizens of Massachusetts sent rum into Maine
for storage. Defendant took the rum and the plaintiffs sued him. 5
Defendant defended on the basis of a Maine statute which provided
that no action could be maintained for the recovery of spiritous liquors
or their value.96 The court first referred to the provision of the Maine
Constitution that guaranteed a remedy for damage to property. 7 It
went on to declare that while the state could determine that possession
of liquor was illegal, it had not done so.1 8 Under the circumstances,
said the court, plaintiffs had a property interest in the rum and it was
unconstitutional to deny them a remedy when the rum was taken
from them. 9 The defense failed. When the opinion of the Justices
of the New Hampshire Superior Court of Judicature was requested
on a similar statute, they also declared that the statute would violate
the constitutional provisions requiring a remedy for wrongs. 10 0
In 1885, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was asked to
construe a law found in the Provincial Statutes for 1692-1693.10°
The owner of certain property had agreed that plaintiff could build
a wall on the lot line, placing one-half on the plaintiff's property and
one-half on the owner's. He further agreed that he would pay one91. Sanderson v. City of Willmar, 282 Minn. 1, 162 N.W.2d 494 (1968).
92. See Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 898 (1966). Cf. Jenkins v. Ballantyne, 8 Utah 245, 30 P. 760 (1892).
93. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
94. Id. See especially the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan, id. at 342.
95. Preston v. Drew, 33 Me. 558 (1852).
96. Id. at 559.
97. Id. at 560.
98. Id. at 560-61.
99. Id. at 562-63.
100. Opinion of the Justices, 25 N.H. 537 (1852).
101. Wilkins v. Jewett, 139 Mass. 29, 29 N.E. 214 (1885).
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half of the cost when he used the wall. The land was then subject to
a mortgage, which was later foreclosed, and defendant came into
possession. It was clear that the agreement could not bind the defendant. However, since the Massachusetts Constitution continued in
force all the provincial laws not repugnant thereto, plaintiff argued
that a provincial statute should apply. 10 2 That statute permitted an
owner to build a wall, and to put half on his own land and half on his
neighbor's land. The neighbor then had to pay one-half of the cost
of the wall if he tied into it. The court stated that this law could not
help the plaintiff, because it was repugnant to the constitution: "It
assumes to take private property without due process of law, and
without compensation.'

03

The courts have been just as adamant about laws designed to
interfere with a person's exclusive possession of his own land. In
Smith v. Bivens, 04 the plaintiff owned 8,000 acres of grazing land
in South Carolina and leased grazing privileges to others. In 1891,
the General Assembly passed a law revoking the rule which required
owners of livestock to keep their animals fenced, and also revoking
the rule which granted the right of distraint to those whose land was
trespassed upon.0 5 Thereafter, cattle came upon plaintiff's land. Plaintiff sued and claimed that the statute in question violated the United
States Constitution.'
The court stated that while due process had
not received any exact definition
[i]n the case at bar the complainant, owner of a tract of land, and
as such owner entitled to its exclusive use and enjoyment, is by
an act of the legislature, and without more, deprived of this exclusive use and enjoyment. By the stroke of a pen, it is gone. This
07
seems a clear illustration of what is forbidden in the constitution.
The same result was reached in the South Carolina courts that
same year. 0 8 Ohio is no more friendly to such laws. It has held that
a statute which prohibited a landowner from cutting off intruding
branches of a neighbor's tree would violate the Ohio Constitution and
the fourteenth amendment. 1 9 Such a statute would, in effect, permit
the neighbor to use the owner's land and would violate due process
of law." Even when presented with hard cases, the courts have pre102. Id. at 29, 29 N.E. at 215.
103. Id. at 30, 29 N.E.at 215. Cf. Tetherington v. Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co.,
232 Ill.
522, 83 N.E. 1048 (1908).
104. 56 F. 352 (C.C.D.S.C. 1893).

105. Id. at 353.
106. Id. at 353-54.
107. Id. at 356.

108. Sanders v. Venning, 38 S.C. 502, 17 S.E. 134 (1893).
109. Murray v. Heabron, 35 Ohio Op. 135, 74 N.E.2d 648 (Ct. C.P. 1947).
110. Id. at 136, 74 N.E.2d at 649. Cf. Belden v. Franklin, 28 Ohio C.C.R. 373
(8th Cir. 1905).
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served the owner's right to hold his property free from interference
of others. The Michigan Supreme Court faced such a case in 1931.111
The plaintiff and defendant owned adjoining properties with a strip
of land seven feet wide between their buildings. Half of the strip
belonged to plaintiff and half to defendant. Plaintiff absolutely needed
both halves if he was to continue running his theater. However,
defendant became annoyed at him and put a fence down the center.
Plaintiff, who did not have an easement, took down the fence and
sued. The court recognized plaintiff's plight but declared that defendant had an exclusive right to possession of his property and could
not be deprived of it without due process of law. 112 An important
aspect of this was the right to defend possession and to protect the
property from trespass."'1 Thus, plaintiff lost his case and, presumably, his business.
The courts have shown no less zeal in protecting other types of
property rights. In 1970, a Texas court declared that it would violate
due process of law if it prohibited collection of interest on a contract
made in Mexico, even though the contract would be usurious under
the law of Texas." 4 A similar attitude has been evidenced towards
claims for compensation." 5
While it is usually held that constitutional requirements will be
satisfied as long as a remedy is granted against someone, some courts
have expressed dislike of provisions which shift liability from the
liability-causing person to another. Thus, a statute granting a sheriff
the right to substitute himself with indemnitors when he is sued for
wrongfully levying upon property has been invalidated on due process
grounds. Such a provision permits the taking of property without
granting the owner an effective remedy for the injury done thereby."'
Pursuing rights against the indemnitor may be different, more difficult, and have less deterrent effect than suing the sheriff himself.
These due process decisions do not prohibit interference with a
person's use of property when that use will cause harm to others,11 7
111. Zabowski v. Loerch, 255 Mich. 125, 237 N.W. 386 (1931).
112. Id. at 127, 237 N.W. at 387.
113. Id.
114. Apodaca v. Banco Longoria S.A., 451 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
Cf. Gunn v. Hendry, 43 Ga. 556 (1871).
115. See Geimann v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 158 Cal. 748, 112 P. 553 (1910).
Cf. Killian v. Wolff, 51 Misc. 2d 47, 272 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Dist. Ct. 1966), aff'd, 53
Misc. 2d 1022, 280 N.Y.S.2d 65 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
116. See Levy v. Dunn, 160 N.Y. 504, 55 N.E. 288 (1899); Hein v. Davidson,
5 N.Y. Civ. Proc. 28 (C.P. 1884). Contra, Cory v. Cooper, 117 Cal. App. 495, 4
P.2d 581 (1931).
117. See Corsa v. Tawes, 149 F. Supp. 771 (D. Md.), af'd, 355 U.S. 37 (1957)
(prohibition against taking finned fish with purse nets) ; Moses v. United States, 16
App. D.C. 428 (1900) (emission of dense smoke) ; People v. Caponigri, 169 Misc. 9,
6 N.Y.S.2d 577 (N.Y. City Magis. Ct. 1938) (anti-noise legislation); Jenkins v.
Ballantyne, 8 Utah 245, 30 P. 760 (1892) (destruction of unlicensed dog).
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unless the harm is merely the frustration that comes from hopelessly
lusting after another's belongings. 8 The decisions should not give
the polluter or manufacturer of polluting products any cause for joy.
They do offer relief to injured persons.
B.

Due Process, Life and Liberty

Due process considerations of life need not be treated in detail.
Life is, of course, ultimately involved in cases of personal injury, and
some of these will be discussed below. It should also be noted that
the question of a mother's right to life is rather clearly presented in
abortion cases, and the California Supreme Court has stated that
abortion laws may not require her to seriously jeopardize her life.:,"
She may not be stripped of her ability to seek relief from a dangerous
situation; she may not be forced to go without medical remedy.
Liberty is also involved in abortion questions, 12 0 just as it is involved
when the issue is contraception.

12 1

Liberty forms the very nucleus of the concepts that keep us free.
It is more than the right to be free from physical restraint, but embraces the right to be free in the use of all of our faculties, the right
to live and work anywhere at all, 1

2

and the right to strike. 1 23

It

includes the right to bring up children and to acquire useful knowl2
edge,

24

1 25
the right to travel,1
the right to use one's own property,

,

27

the right to grow a beard or long hair, and "generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.'- 28 While liberty does not mean
unrestrained license to do whatever one desires, 29 it does require that
laws which limit freedom of action be reasonable. Restraints which
118. See, e.g., Zabowski v. Loerch, 255 Mich. 125, 237 N.W. 386 (1931), which
is discussed at notes 111-13 and accompanying text supra.
119. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
120. Id. at 963, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
121. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
122. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) ; State v. Ballance, 229
N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949). Those who claim that people who do not like pollution should just move away would do well to consider the right of each person to live
and work where he pleases. Cf. In re Lee Sing, 43 F. 359 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1890).
123. See Fairview Hosp. Ass'n v. Public Employees Local 113, 241 Minn. 523,
64 N.W.2d 16 (1954). The court treated this as a property question, but this writer
considers it to be a question of personal liberty.
124. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
125. See Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 915 (1953).
126. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) ; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378
U.S. 500 (1964) ; Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
127. See Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970) (long hair) ; Finot
v. Board of Educ., 250 Cal. App. 2d 189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967) (beard).
128. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
129. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). See also Adams v. Shannon,
7 Cal. App. 3d 427, 86 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1970).
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do not bear a reasonable relation to some reasonable objective will
130
be invalidated.
If liberty seeks to preserve the happiness of free men it may be
expected to assure them redress for wrongs committed against them,
including the assaults on their lungs, eyes, brains, livers and other
body parts which are perpetrated by pollution."'
Among the greatest safeguards of bodily integrity are tort laws,
which generally grant relief against the wrongdoer. Many courts have
found that these laws are not only desirable but essential in a free
society. In 1863, an army officer arrested a citizen, and the citizen,
believing the arrest was wrongful, sued the officer for false imprisonment. 2 The officer defended on the ground that since he was acting
under the authority of the President, an act of Congress gave him a
complete defense to the suit. 1"' The court stated that the statute deprived the citizen of all redress for illegal arrests, and went on to
declare that the statute would not bar the action." 4 It concluded that
Congress had attempted to deprive the citizen of liberty without due
process of law, and that the statute was unconstitutional." 5 In Herkey
v. Agar Mfg. Co.,"" the court clearly stated that the passage of laws
which did not permit a remedy for false imprisonment, assault, and
similar torts would deprive the citizen of life and liberty, just as surely
7
as if the legislature declared that such wrongs could be committed."1
It also declared that the same rule must apply to injuries caused by
negligence,Ss a view which has often been expressed.
On April 4, 1868, the Pennsylvania legislature passed an act
which provided that recovery for injuries incurred in railroad accidents would be limited to $3,000.00. This act was set up defensively
in an 1875 case involving a passenger who was injured in a train
derailment." 9 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a per curiam
opinion, affirmed the holding of the court of common pleas, which
130. See, e.g., United States v. Freund, 290 F. 411 (D. Mont. 1923); Galyon v.
Municipal Court, 229 Cal. App. 2d 667, 40 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1964).
131. One should not entirely ignore mental and emotional damage caused by noise,

grey skies, and other environmental problems. Cf. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728,
441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10
Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).

132. Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370 (1863).
133. Id. at 371-72.
134. Id. at 372-73.

135. In a concurring opinion, Justice Hanna stated that Congress could no more
shield an offender from liability than it could pass a law directly depriving the citizen
of liberty. Id. at 397.
136. 90 Misc. 457, 153 N.Y.S. 369 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
137. Id. at 461, 153 N.Y.S. at 371.

138. Id. Cf. Neely v. St. Francis Hosp. & School of Nursing, 192 Kan. 716,
391 P.2d 155 (1964) ; Vanderbilt v. Hegeman, 157 Misc. 908, 284 N.Y.S. 586 (Sup.
Ct. 1935).

139. Central Ry. of N.J. v. Cook, 1 W.N.C. 319 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1875).
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had declared the law unconstitutional.14 ° The exact ground of the
court's holding was not clear, but a few years later it declared that
the statute was unconstitutional because it attempted to limit the
plaintiff's right to recover the full amount of the pecuniary damages
caused by the defendant's wrongdoing. 4 ' The court said that the
constitutional provision guaranteeing a remedy by due course of law
means a full remedy and not merely a portion of the actual damages. 4
New York has taken the same approach. In Williams v. Port
Chester,14 plaintiff was injured when he slipped on a sidewalk. Due
to his injuries the plaintiff was unable to file an action within the
short (thirty day) claim period and the village asserted that his action
was barred. The court stated that due process required a remedy:
The purpose sought to be accomplished [by the constitutional
provision] was to afford protection to all rights of mankind, and
it is not material that we should be able to say precisely what
right is violated - whether of life, liberty or property; but any
encroachment upon the fundamental rights of the individual was
to find a certain remedy in the law.' 44
Therefore, since the limitation ordinance was unreasonable under these
circumstances, it was unconstitutional to apply it to the plaintiff.
The same sort of view was expressed in Gallegher v. Davis. "'
In discussing a typical guest statute, 46 the court stated that the legislature cannot declare a substantial injury to be no injury at all, nor
may it abolish the right to recover damages for negligent injury without substituting another remedy in its place, for the right to an action
is founded in natural justice, and is fundamental and essential. 47 The
court went on to find the guest statute constitutional, because of the
special relation between guest and host, and because of the prevalence
48
of fraudulent suits in this area.'

The final result of the Gallegher case perhaps leaves the impression that causes of action or remedies can be abolished at will if the
legislature decides it would be a good idea to do so. That has not been
140. Id. at 319.

141. Thirteenth & Fifteenth St. Pass. Ry. v. Boudrou, 92 Pa. 475 (1880).
142. Id. at 482, where the court said: "A limitation of recovery to a sum less
than the actual damage, is palpably in conflict with the right to remedy by the due

course of law."

143. 72 App. Div. 505, 76 N.Y.S. 631 (1902), aff'd, 183 N.Y. 550, 76 N.E. 1116

(1905).
144. Id. at 510, 76 N.Y.S. at 634.
145. 37 Del. 380, 183 A. 620 (1936).
146. That is, a statute which prevents a guest in an automobile from suing his
host for injuries caused by negligent operation of the vehicle.
147. Gallegher v. Davis, 37 Del. 380, 392, 183 A. 620, 625 (1936).
148. Accord, Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929). Guest statute cases are an
anomoly in the law. The statutes are a virtual licensing of host negligence, a type
of law the courts normally reject out of hand.
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the rule. Libel actions present an interesting case study. Here the
public's interest in free communication clashes with the individual's
interest in having his reputation unblemished by untrue publications.' 49
Over the years many states have passed laws which, in varying ways,
preclude an injured person from recovering general damages on account of a libel by newspaper, if the newspaper publishes a retraction.
As early as 1888, the Michigan Supreme Court declared that such
an attempt to remove the citizen's reputation from the protection of
the law would be unconstitutional. 5 ' The same result has been reached
in other cases.' 5 ' In striking down a statute of this type, the New
Jersey Supreme Court has declared that the right to protect oneself
from an unwarranted attack on reputation is a part of the right to
enjoy life and obtain safety and happiness. 15 2 Two of the cases referred to above arose in states which have a constitutional provision
expressly protecting reputation.53 To that extent they may not appear
to be authority for the general due process proposition. Still, they
show how careful many courts have been when it comes to denying a
remedy for wrongs against the citizen. Even the courts that have
sustained this sort of statute have emphasized the unique interest
in free communication as a justification for the different remedy,' 54
or have suggested that retraction is as good a remedy as general damages, since the effect of each is speculative at best.' 55 The very attitude of the courts when they struggle with a statute which seems to
deny a remedy for injury reinforces the original proposition that
justice and due process demand remedies. Strong public policy, such
as preservation of family life,' 56 or removal of grave frauds and
abuses,' must be shown before the elimination of an effective remedy
for a possible wrong will be allowed. Meanwhile, courts continue to
find that constitutional provisions require granting of a cause of action
149. See Afro-American Pub. Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Needless to say the scales weigh ever heavier against the right to reputation. See,
e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Bon Air Hotel v. Time, Inc.,
426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970). See also Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 39 U.S.L.W. 4264

(U.S., Feb. 24, 1971).

150. Park v. Detroit Free Press Co., 72 Mich. 560, 40 N.W. 731 (1888).
151. See, e.g., Post Pub. Co. v. Butler, 137 F. 723 (6th Cir. 1905); Hanson v.
Krehbiel, 68 Kan. 670, 75 P. 1041 (1904).
152. Neafie v. Hoboken Printing & Pub. Co., 75 N.J.L. 564, 68 A. 146 (Ct. Err &
App. 1907).
153. See cases cited in note 151 supra.
154. See, e.g., Werner v. Southern Cal. Assoc. Newspapers, 35 Cal. 2d 121, 216
P.2d 825 (1950), appeal dismissed on motion of appellant, 340 U.S. 910 (1951).
155. See Holden v. Pioneer Broadcasting Co., 228 Ore. 405, 365 P.2d 845 (1961),
appeal dismissed, 370 U.S. 157 (1962).
156. See Heckendorn v. First Nat'l Bank, 19 Ill. 2d 190, 166 N.E.2d 571, cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 882 (1960) (spousal tort).
157. See Rotwein v. Gersten, 160 Fla. 736, 36 So. 2d 419 (1948) (heart balm
statute).
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and remedy where they have not previously been thought to exist; for
example, for loss of consortium,'" and for privacy.""
Surely the legislature's hands are not tied and it may prospectively adjust the definition of wrongs and change or replace remedies.
This does not give it the right or power to deny entirely effective
remedies for the serious personal injuries inflicted upon the individual
by those who directly cause degradation of the environment, or who
indirectly do so by selling goods which will clearly have that effect.
Our constitutional right to life, liberty, and property is not too puny
to withstand these assaults upon us.
C.

Sovereign Immunity and Eminent Domain

These two concepts will be examined because while they subtend
slightly different issues from those discussed above, they support the
major thesis by analogy. Sovereign immunity is one method of cuting off the individual's right to a remedy for wrongs committed
against him. Eminent domain, on the other hand, insists that takings
of property, which would be a wrong if uncompensated, be accompanied with just compensation. The latter concept is of interest here
because of its explication of what constitutes taking or damaging of
an individual's property.
1.

Sovereign Immunity

The purpose of this article is not to indulge in a lengthy discussion of sovereign immunity and the justifications, if indeed there are
any, for the doctrine. That has been done elsewhere.' 6 ° Sovereign
immunity is discussed here only to demonstrate the attitude of a number of courts when faced with the prospect of denying the individual
a remedy for a wrong committed against him.
An important distinction in this area is highlighted by two Oregon
cases, Mattson v. City of Astoria' and Pullen v. City of Eugene.162 In
158. Umpleby v. Dorsey, 39 Ohio Op. 2d 450, 10 Ohio Misc. 288, 227 N.E.2d 274
(Ct. C.P. 1967) (due process guarantee of a cause of action for loss of consortium).
Accord, Clouston v. Remlinger Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc., 22 Ohio. St. 2d 65, 258
N.E.2d 230 (1970).
159. Nader v. General Motors Corp., 57 Misc. 2d 301, 292 N.Y.S.2d 514 (Sup.
Ct. 1968), aff'd, 31 App. Div. 2d 392, 298 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1969), aff'd, 25 N.Y.2d 560,
255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970). The New York Supreme Court founded
its opinion in part on a constitutional right of privacy. The appellate courts did not
do so.
160. See, e.g., Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers (pts. 1-2), 77 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 209 (1963). Cf. Cahn, The New Sovereign Immunity, 81 HARV. L. REV.
929 (1968).
161. 39 Ore. 577, 65 P. 1066 (1901).
162. 77 Ore. 320, 146 P. 822 (1915).
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Mattson, the plaintiff sustained injury on a public street which was in
disrepair. The city charter purported to relieve the city itself and the
common counsel from liability for such injuries. The court declared that
while the city could exempt itself from liability, it could not, at the same
time, grant an exemption to those who were charged with the duty
of repair.16 3 If it were permitted to do so, the injured party would
be denied all remedy and the constitutional requirement of a remedy
for all wrongs would be violated. 1 4 In Pullen, on the other hand,
the plaintiff was injured on a defective sidewalk and the city charter
exempted only the city from liability. The court found that the constitution was complied with since the provision did not exempt the
responsible officers.16 So while respondeat superior might have been
done away with, the actual wrongdoer could be sued. Other courts
have gone further and have declared that a city cannot abolish' 66 or
unreasonably limit 67 a cause of action against itself since that would
deprive the citizen of a remedy for a wrong committed against him.
The same theory has been applied to laws which would give
both the government and the tax collector immunity from an action
for alleged improper tax assessment or collection. Such a statute
would deprive the individual of property without due process of law.' 68
The Florida Supreme Court adopted a slightly different approach
in Maxwell v. City of Miami. 69 When sovereign immunity was asserted
as a defense to an action against the city arising out of the negligent
operation of a fire department vehicle, the court held that due process
of law would not permit such immunity. 7 ° The court stated that
any unnecessary interference with the private rights of the citizens
denied them due process, and that there was no reasonable necessity
for operating city vehicles in a negligent manner. 1 7 Thus, it reasoned, to deny a remedy for the negligence would unreasonably impair the private rights of those lawfully on the streetsY.2 This holding
is somewhat reminiscent of the eminent domain requirement that
163.
164.
165.
166.

39 Ore. at 580-81, 65 P. at 1067.
Id. at 580, 65 P. at 1067.
77 Ore. at 326, 146 P. at 824.
Lebohm v. City of Galveston, 154 Tex. 192, 275 S.W.2d 951 (1955). See also

Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N.E. 72 (1919), overruled sub
norn., Aldrich v. City of Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N.E. 164 (1922).
167. Herkey v. Agar Mfg. Co., 90 Misc. 457, 153 N.Y.S. 369 (Sup. Ct. 1915)
Hanks v. City of Port Arthur, 121 Tex. 202, 48 S.W.2d 944 (1932). Cf. Neely v.
St. Francis Hosp. & School of Nursing, 192 Kan. 716, 391 P.2d 155 (1964) (charitable immunity).
168. See, e.g., Graham v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409 (1931) ; Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust
and Say. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930).
169. 87 Fla. 107, 100 So. 147 (1924).
170. Id. at 113-14, 100 So. at 149.
171. Id. at 114, 100 So. at 149.
172. Id. Cf. Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol16/iss5/1

20

Fernandez: Due Process and Pollution: The Right to a Remedy

MAY

1971]

DUE PROCESS AND POLLUTION

809

property may only be taken for public purposes and then only if just
compensation is paid. It suggests the rather close connection between
all of the concepts under consideration. That is not surprising; the
catalyst for all of them is basic justice.
2.

Eminent Domain

The eminent domain clause of the fifth amendment directs that
private property shall not "be taken for public use, without just compensation." The companion provisions in many state constitutions

78
expand this to read "taken or damaged.'
It is clear enough that a seizure of a person's land will be a

taking. 7 4 Similarly, where the land is entirely flooded with water it
is taken, 75 and occasional flooding will constitute a partial taking.'7 6
Even if the thing taken seems insignificant, such as the tops of a
person's trees, a taking exists and must be compensated.' 77 Nor may
an indirect taking be accomplished by means of a zoning ordinance
78
that destroys value and prevents transfer, except to the city.'

But what of more intangible things, such as noise and vibrations?
What of things that merely pass over the property without touching

it? What of water or air pollution?
Noise and vibrations may cause a taking of property. It has

been held that it is quite proper to give an owner damages in condemnation for depreciation in the value of his property from the
7
whistles, bells, and rattling of trainsY.'
The same has been declared
when airplane flights over private land are frequent and interfere
with its use on account of the noise and vibrations they cause. 8 0 The
fact that the surface of the land is never entered upon is irrelevant.
Governmental agencies may send things other than airplanes
across private property. They may decide to fire guns across it for
the purpose of target practice. Even if none of the projectiles land
173. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 14.
174. See, e.g., Morse v. Stocker, 83 Mass. 150 (1861).
175. Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872).
176. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) ; King v. United States, 427
F.2d 767 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
177. Shipp v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 431 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1088 (1969). One tree was to be cut from 50.9 feet
down to 20 feet, and the other from 39.7 feet to 20 feet.
178. See Sanderson v. Willmar, 282 Minn. 1, 162 N.W.2d 494 (1968).
179. Little Rock, M. & T. Ry. Co. v. Allen, 41 Ark. 431 (1883). See Omaha &
N.P.R. Co. v. Janecek, 30 Neb. 276, 46 N.W. 478 (1890). Cf. Dennison v. State,
22 N.Y.2d 409, 239 N.E.2d 708, 293 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1968), regarding highway noise,
light, and odors.
180. See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). See also Kline, The SST and Inverse Condemnation,
15 VILL. L. Rv.887 (1970).
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upon the property itself and even if the guns are not fired frequently,
the owner and his guests might well become nervous. Such activity
constitutes a taking and must be compensated.'
Stringing wires
over the land is no less obnoxious, and must also be compensated. 2
Again, the fact that the surface of the land is never entered upon
is not significant. The activity is basically trespassory and is a taking.
When invasion comes in small particles rather than in the form
of projectiles the result may be the same. Thus, when road work caused
sand, clay, and other materials to deposit in the plaintiff's lake during
a rain, a taking resulted, and the plaintiff was entitled to just compensation. 3 Air pollution cases have often reached the same result.
Writing with copious citations on eminent domain theory, John
Lewis stated: "The owner of land has a right that the air which
comes upon his premises shall come in its natural condition, free from
artificial impurities.""' 4 He later stated: "The impregnation of the
atmosphere with noxious mixtures that pass over my land is an invasion of a natural right, a right incident to the land itself, and
85
essential to its beneficial enjoyment.")

When a sewer district operated a septic tank in such a way that
noxious and offensive odors wafted onto the plaintiff's land, the court
found that a taking had occurred. 6 The operation of a cremator that
gave off a stench which caused the plaintiff discomfort,8 7 and the
building of a sewer that permitted gas to escape18 8 have been similarly
treated.
It has also been held that when smoke, dirt, and cinders from
trains are carried through the air to the plaintiff's property, he has
sustained a compensable injury, for he need not suffer this form of
pollution.' 9 The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in
Richards v. Washington Terminal Company.'
In that case the
plaintiff lived about 114 feet away from the defendant's railroad
181. See Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327
(1922) ; Peabody v. United States, 231 U.S. 530 (1913) ; Eyherabide v. United States,
345 F.2d 565 (Ct. Cl. 1965) ; Atwater v. United States, 106 Ct. Cl. 196 (1946).
182. Lamont v. West Penn. Power Co., 300 Pa. 78, 150 A. 155 (1930).
183. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Thomas, 202 So. 2d 925 (Miss. Sup.
Ct. 1967).
184. 1 J. LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE
UNITED STATES 451 (3d ed. 1909).
185. Id. at 452.
186. Sewer Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Fiscus, 128 Ark. 250, 193 S.W. 521 (1917).
187. Kobbe v. Village of New Brighton, 20 Misc. 477, 45 N.Y.S. 777 (Sup. Ct.),
af'd, 23 App. Div. 243, 48 N.Y.S. 990 (1897).
188. Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238, 27 P. 604 (1891).
189. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Schmidgall, 91 Ill. App. 23 (1900) ; Illinois Cent. Ry.
v. Elliott, 129 Ky. 121, 110 S.W. 817 (1908). Cf. Omaha & N.P. R.R. v. Janecek,
30 Neb. 276, 46 N.W. 478 (1890).
190. 233 U.S. 546 (1914).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol16/iss5/1

22

Fernandez: Due Process and Pollution: The Right to a Remedy

MAY

1971]

DUE PROCESS AND POLLUTION

811

tunnel. Gases, smoke, cinders, dust, and dirt were emitted from the
tunnel. Particles settled upon the plaintiff's property and the air was
polluted. The Court stated that the plaintiff would not be able to
recover if the injury were simply the general type that comes from
the operation of the trains, but found that the damage to this plaintiff was more extensive.'
The defendant was directed to either acquire the plaintiff's property or cease damaging it. 192 While the Court
did prevent this pollution of plaintiff's air, it also included a balancing or public nuisance theory in its decision. 193 This sort of theory
is quite useful when non-virulent conditions are involved and the injury to the public in general is negligible, while the plaintiff at bar
is suffering great detriment. As suggested earlier, however, it is not
at all useful or proper if measurable wrongs are being inflicted upon
94
the public, even if the number of injured people is quite large.'
People and their property can be injured without using artillery
shells or airplanes. Molecules will do as well. When these injuries
occur, or are threatened, an effective remedy must be given. Anything less is a taking, a destruction, or a deprivation of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law.
D.

Injunction -

The Effective Remedy

If a remedy for wrongs is required, that remedy should also be
effective. It is generally said that a person will not be heard to complain about the type of remedy granted, because no one has a right
to any particular form of remedy. Nevertheless, the generality should
not be permitted to swallow the basic principle. Plainly, a statute
which fixed the maximum recovery for negligence or for intentional
torts at one dollar would destroy the remedy itself.'
And one court
has stated that where it is obvious that the only truly effective remedy
is injunctive relief, impairment of the remedy will offend fundamental principles of justice and will be improper.' 9 6
The long term continuing damage caused by pollution is a classic
example of a situation where injunctive relief ought to be permitted.
In pesticide pollution, for example, our bodies may be invaded daily
by small quantities of hard pesticides, such as D.D.T. While each
191. Id. at 550-51.
192. Id. at 557.
193. Id. at 553.
194. See notes 41-46 and accompanying text supra.
195. See Thirteenth & Fifteenth St. Pass. Ry. v. Boudrou, 92 Pa. 475 (1880);
Cent. Ry. of N.J. v. Cook, 1 W.N.C. 319 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1875). See also notes 139-42
and accompanying text supra.

196. Phelps Dodge Copper Prod. v. United E., R. & M. Workers of America, 138
N.J. Eq. 3, 46 A.2d 453 (Ct. Ch.), aff'd, 139 N.J. Eq. 97, 49 A.2d 896 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1946).
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intrusion of this long-lived chemical may be a wrong, it will seem
minor. Even if damages were granted day-by-day, each day's damage
would be slight. Indeed, in the absence of a trespass or strict liability
theory which declared that the intrusion of the chemical, and not the
harm caused, was the injury, it might not be possible to show daily
damage. But when the concentrations of the pesticide finally reach
a critical level, liver cancer or a brain hemorrhage may be precipitated. 117 Under such circumstances, telling the citizen to wait for the
ultimate disease is not only callous, it also deprives him of an effective
remedy. It may even deprive him of his life. If it does, he will have
lost his life without due process of law. Damages will not afford
him adequate relief. The only effective relief would have been an
injunction or other restraint when the accumulation of the deadly
chemical began. The same can be said of lead poisoning from gasoline or the damage caused by air pollution. No man should be required
to contract lung cancer or emphysema before he is granted his remedy.
Just as the state could not order that he be poisoned on condition that
his family be given a payment from the state treasury, it should not
be permitted to effectively license others to do the same thing.
These conditions of irreparable harm, insufficiency of pecuniary
relief, multiplicity of actions, and difficulty of ascertaining the amount
of adequate compensation are some of the factors which have historically supported injunctive relief.' 9 8 The point made here is that
they may, in certain instances, rise to a constitutional level.
The courts have not, apparently, seen fit to declare that an injunction must be granted where personal injuries are involved.' 99
However, they have often issued such declarations in the area of
property damage, and principles which apply to property should also
be applied to the protection of life and liberty." °°
In Wilmarth v. Woodcock,2"' the defendant intentionally permitted the cornice of his barn to extend over the plaintiff's property,
197. See Radomski, et al., supra note 23, at 209.
198. See, e.g., California Code of Civ. Proc. § 526.
199. This does not mean that injunctions for personal torts are improper; it only
means that this writer has not located any cases stating that they are constitutionally
required, though one case comes very close. Hanks v. Yancey, 265 S.W. 233 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1924). Many courts have said that injunctions will not usually be given to
restrain commission of personal torts. E.g., Alberti v. Cruise, 383 F.2d 268 (4th Cir.
1967); United States v. Marine Eng'rs' Bene. Ass'n, No. 38, 277 F. 830 (W.D.
Wash. 1921). Nevertheless, such injunctions are often granted. See e.g., Harris
Stanley Coal Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 154 F.2d 450 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 761 (1946) ; Machado v. Machado, 58 Cal. 2d 501, 375 P.2d 55, 25 Cal. Rptr.
87 (1962) ; Hanks v. Yancey, 265 S.W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
200. See, e.g., Joe Louis Milk Co. v. Hershey, 243 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ill. 1965);
Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley, 59 Cal. 2d 247, 379 P.2d 22, 28 Cal. Rptr.
718 (1963).
201. 58 Mich. 482, 25 N.W. 475 (1885).
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and when the plaintiff sued him the defendant suggested that she be
limited to an action at law for damages. The Michigan Supreme
Court rejected this proposition and declared that to so hold would
permit the defendant to deprive plaintiff of her property without condemnation and without due process of law. 20 2 Seventy-one years later
the Michigan court was asked to pass on a very similar fact situation.
This time a building and not merely a cornice was encroaching. 3
The intervening years had not changed the court's position. It again
declined to permit the defendant to pay damages and remain. It again
stated that it would not allow the taking of plaintiff's property without compensation as such action would be a violation of the demands
20

of due process.

4

When faced with a type of air pollution in 1911, the California
Supreme Court expressed the same point of view. 20 Dust escaping
from the defendant's cement plant settled upon the plaintiffs' property,
damaged their orange groves, and made life in plaintiffs' homes uncomfortable. Defendant showed that it had spent eight hundred thousand dollars developing its property, that it had a large payroll, and
that it could only operate profitably in that particular place. It asked
that it be permited to give a bond for any damage it might cause to
plaintiffs, but the court rejected the request. Even a bond for the full
value of the plaintiffs' property was no substitute for injunctive relief.
Said the court:
To permit the cement company to continue its operations, even to
the extent of destroying the property of the two plaintiffs and
requiring payment of the full value thereof, would be, in effect,
allowing the seizure of private property for a use other than a
public one - something unheard of and totally unauthorized in
the law.200
Defendant asked that a balancing test be applied and the court rejected
the suggestion, while noting that balancing was simply a way of putting the weak at the mercy of the powerful. 2 7 This comment, unfortunately, explains the crux of our present environmental problems.
Resources, beauty, cleanliness, and even our personal health and welfare have often been sacrificed to the powerful by the use of various
balancing tests.
202. Id. at 485, 25 N.W. at 476.
203. Sokel v. Nickoli, 347 Mich. 146, 79 N.W.2d 485 (1956).
204. Id. at 152, 79 N.W.2d at 488. In 1963, Maryland applied this principle to
prevent defendant from misappropriating a right of way. Columbia Hills Corp. v.
Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 231 Md. 379, 190 A.2d 635 (1963).
205. Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239, 118 P. 928 (1911).
206. Id. at 245, 118 P. at 930. See also Anderson v. American Smelting & Refining
Co., 265 F. 928 (D. Utah 1919).
207. 161 Cal. at 247-48, 118 P. at 931-32.
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A dissenting judge in a recent case, which also involved cement
plants, expressed the same view. 208 He pointed out that to permit
such a plant to continue operating and to continue putting dust and
smoke into the air was, in effect, granting a license for a continuing
wrong. It permitted the company to destroy property, and to contribute to cancer, emphysema, bronchitis and asthma, if it would pay
damages. Not only was a wrong licensed, but the result also permitted
the taking of property for a private use and violated due process.

20

9

Injunctive relief or its equivalent may be the only effective remedy.
When it is, justice demands that it be granted.210
CONCLUSION

We are faced with a serious environmental crisis. While the
common law has sufficient tools to answer the need, we have often
lost sight of that fact. We have forgotten that many of its principles
are not merely matters of convenience, but are based on the requirements of fundamental justice.
Those requirements find their constitutional expression in the
concept of "due process," the very touchstone of our freedom.21 ' If
the law of a particular state seems to leave the citizen without a
remedy for the enormous harms perpetrated by the various forms
of pollution, he should call this clause to the attention of the courts.
He should note that the government cannot fail to provide him with
an effective remedy for the destruction of his property and injury to
his health. Failure would assail one of the most salutory requirements of our constitutional system, the inexorable command that no
man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law.
Destructive pollution must be eliminated. Through the constitutions, our forebears have given us the puissance; we must supply
the will.
208. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d
312 (1970) (Jasen, J., dissenting).
209. The majority of the Boomer court, in a most regressive opinion, abrogated
New York's non-balancing test. The court, while claiming its inability to decide such
matters, decided them. It favored the polluter and granted private condemnation
damages only, without injunctive relief.
210. This portion of the discussion is not intended to deny the possibility or desirability of additional relief. Damages for harm already done, or to be expected from
what has been done, should also be available. This portion of the article has concentrated on injunctive relief, since the requirement that it be a part of the remedy
may not otherwise have seemed obvious.
211. See A. HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE (1968); 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES * 423-24; 1 COKE'S INSTITUTES, SECOND INSTITUTE 45-56 (1797).
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